BACKGROUND *Guide*

GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1

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Letter from the Dais

Dear Delegates of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee,

Throughout history, the pursuit of military superiority has challenged international peace and security. Today, ballistic missiles and their associated technologies remain a significant concern, capable of intensifying arms races, escalating regional tensions and threatening international stability. Yet, the technologies behind these systems can also serve peaceful purposes, including space exploration. The challenge before the international community is to prevent their proliferation and misuse while respecting the legitimate interests of states.

The United Nations was founded on the principle that international challenges must be addressed through dialogue and cooperation. As delegates of the General Assembly First Committee, you will take on this responsibility by examining existing international mechanisms, identifying their limitations and negotiating realistic solutions. Your task extends beyond understanding the issue itself. It requires you to understand your nation's policies, defend its interests and work with others to develop proposals that are both practical and internationally acceptable.

This Background Guide serves as the foundation for your preparation, not a replacement for individual research. We encourage every delegate to explore their nation's position in depth, examine existing frameworks such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Hague Code of Conduct, and approach the agenda with curiosity, discipline and a willingness to engage with differing perspectives.

OOBMUN is a conference that demands preparation, confidence and intellectual discipline. Regardless of your experience, we expect you to contribute meaningfully, support your arguments with sound research and approach negotiations with purpose. The success of this committee will not be measured solely by speeches or awards, but by the quality of debate, the strength of diplomacy and the solutions you help develop.

We look forward to meeting each of you and seeing the dedication, research and diplomacy you bring to GA1. **We will see you on 31st October at OOBMUN'26.**

Best Regards,

Abdur Rahman - Head Chair, GA1 at OOBMUN'26
Nabhan Noorish - Co-Chair, GA1 at OOBMUN'26
Reihan Safeer -Co-Chair, GA1 at OOBMUN'26

Introduction to the committee

The **General Assembly First Committee,** formally known as the **Disarmament & International Security Committee (GA1)**, is one of the six main committees of the United Nations General Assembly. It considers matters concerning disarmament, the regulation of armaments, international security and global challenges and threats to peace. The Committee also considers measures intended to strengthen international stability through cooperation and lower levels of armaments.

The First Committee traces its origins to the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, when it was known as the **Political and Security Committee.** It held its first meeting on 11 January 1946. On 24 January 1946, the General Assembly adopted **Resolution 1(I),** establishing a commission to address the problems created by the discovery of atomic energy. This became the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly, demonstrating how closely disarmament and international security were connected to the UN's earliest work.

Mandate

The legal foundation of GA1 comes primarily from **Chapter IV of the UN**

Charter, which establishes the functions and powers of the General Assembly.

The most important provision for the First Committee is Article 11, which states

"The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments..."

Article 11 further allows the General Assembly to make recommendations concerning these principles to Member States or to the Security Council. It also permits the Assembly to discuss questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and to draw the attention of the Security Council to situations likely to endanger international peace and security.

This establishes the core mandate of GA1: to consider the principles, policies, and cooperative measures through which states can address disarmament and international security.

This authority is reinforced by **Article 10**, which gives the General Assembly the ability to discuss matters within the scope of the Charter and, subject to Article 12, make recommendations to Member States or the Security Council.

Additionally, **Article 14** allows the General Assembly to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of situations that may impair friendly relations among nations or the general welfare. This gives the Assembly and, consequently, its committees, within their respective mandates, a wider role in addressing situations that may contribute to international instability.

However, **Article 12** establishes an important procedural limitation: while the Security Council is exercising its Charter functions regarding a particular dispute or situation, the General Assembly cannot make recommendations concerning that matter unless the Security Council requests it.

Accordingly, the mandate of GA1 can be summarised as:

- **Disarmament and arms control**
- **Regulation of armaments**
- **International security**
- **Non-proliferation**
- **Reduction of risks created by weapons and military technologies**
- **Cooperation and confidence-building between states**
- **Emerging threats to international peace and security**
- **Measures designed to strengthen international stability**

Authority, Membership & Disarmament Machinery:

The First Committee primarily operates through **discussions, negotiation, drafting and voting,** considering matters within its mandate and developing draft resolutions and decisions for consideration by the General Assembly. Its resolutions **call upon, urge or encourage** Member States to take actions, request further reports or studies, establish principles and frameworks, promote negotiations and encourage transparency and confidence-building.

GA1 consists of representatives of all **UN Member States**, with each state having **one vote** under Article 18 of the UN Charter. In the General Assembly, important questions require a **two-thirds majority of members present and voting,** while other questions require a majority; within committees, decisions are generally made by a majority of members and voting under the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure.

GA1 also forms part of the wider UN disarmament system, working alongside the **United Nations Disarmament Commission**, a deliberative body that develops recommendations and guidelines on disarmament, the **Conference on Disarmament**, a Geneva-based multilateral negotiating forum for major disarmament issues and the **United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,** which supports international efforts in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Delegates should therefore ensure that all proposals remain

within the Committee's mandate, reflect realistic international cooperation and are capable of practical implementation.

Importance of GA1

The importance of the First Committee grew significantly during the **Cold War**, as nuclear weapons and arms races became central international security concerns. The General Assembly subsequently convened three major **Special Sessions on Disarmament** in **1978, 1982 and 1988,** producing major declarations and programmes on international disarmament. Since then, GA1's agenda has continued to evolve alongside developments in conventional weapons, outer space, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence and other emerging military technologies.

The First Committee remains a central forum for addressing international security through disarmament, arms control, cooperation and the development of international norms. Its work allows Member States to negotiate common positions, reduce security risks, develop frameworks for cooperation and address emerging threats. As military technologies continue to evolve, GA1 provides a platform for states to determine how these capabilities should be regulated, how risks can be reduced and what principles should guide international security.

Introduction to the Agenda - Strengthening International Mechanisms to Prevent the Proliferation & Misuse of Ballistic Missiles and Missile Technology

Ballistic missiles are a major concern to international peace and security because of their ability to deliver payloads over long distances and, in some cases, carry weapons of mass destruction. Their proliferation can increase regional tensions, fuel arms races and create risks when missile systems, components or related technologies are transferred to other actors. The issue is made more complex by the dual-use nature of missile technology. Propulsion, guidance, materials and staging technologies can support peaceful space programmes while also being used to develop military missiles.

Unlike nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles are not governed by a single universal, legally binding multilateral treaty covering their development, production, possession or transfer. Instead, the current framework relies on a combination of political commitments, export controls, transparency measures, regional cooperation and, in specific cases, binding UN Security Council measures. This fragmented system creates gaps in enforcement and makes it difficult to establish common standards while also respecting legitimate peaceful uses of related technology.

International efforts to address missile proliferation developed significantly during the late twentieth century. The **Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)** was established in 1987 to coordinate national export controls on missile-related goods and technologies. After the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the discovery of Iraq's undeclared missile programmes exposed major weaknesses in international monitoring and export controls. The United Nations later used binding measures in cases such as Iraq under the Security Council Resolution 687, while

other cases, including Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, have also involved international restrictions and sanctions.

In 2002, **the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC)** was established as a political transparency and confidence-building mechanism. Participating states commit to measures such as Pre-Launch Notifications and Annual Declarations concerning ballistic missile and space-launch activities. However, the HCoC does not provide universal legal obligations or intrusive verification or enforcement mechanisms, leaving important gaps in the wider non-proliferation framework.

These challenges are becoming more complex as missile technology develops. Additive manufacturing, commercial off-the-shelf electronics, advanced guidance systems and domestic production capabilities can make traditional export controls harder to enforce. At the same time, missile programmes have developed under very different security conditions across the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East and South Asia, making a single approach difficult to apply universally.

The United Nations continues to address these challenges through the General Assembly and its First Committee. In December 2024, the General Assembly adopted **Resolution 79/29 on the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation**, reaffirming the importance of transparency, confidence-building and international efforts to prevent proliferation.

This agenda before the GA1 therefore asks how existing mechanisms can be strengthened, better coordinated and more effective. We must consider gaps in export controls, transparency, technology transfers, verification, confidence-building and international cooperation while also addressing the dual-use nature of missile technology and legitimate peaceful aerospace activities. The central challenge is to create mechanisms that reduce the risks of ballistic missile proliferation

and misuse while remaining practical, credible and internationally acceptable in an evolving security environment.

Key Terms

Ballistic missile: A rocket-propelled weapon that follows a largely ballistic trajectory after its initial powered flight to deliver a payload to a designated target.

Dual-use technology: Technology with legitimate civilian applications that can also be adapted for military purposes, including weapons development.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs): Weapons capable of causing large-scale casualties or destruction, encompassing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Non-state actors: Organisations or individuals operating independently of governments that may acquire, develop or transfer weapons and related technologies.

Disarmament: The reduction or elimination of weapons and military capabilities through unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): A voluntary political arrangement coordinating export controls to restrict the proliferation of missiles and related technologies capable of delivering WMDs.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC): A voluntary international instrument promoting transparency through missile-launch notifications and declarations of relevant activities.

End-user verification: The process of confirming a recipient's identity and ensuring exported goods or technologies reach their authorised destination and intended use.

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs): Measures that increase the openness of military activities and reduce uncertainty, mistrust and the risk of escalation between states.

Deterrence: A strategy intended to prevent hostile action by convincing an adversary that its anticipated costs would outweigh its potential gains.

Arms race: A competitive expansion of military capabilities in which states respond to perceived threats by strengthening their own arsenals.

Dual-use dilemma: The challenge of regulating technology that supports legitimate civilian development but can also facilitate military or WMD-related programmes.

Compliance and enforcement gap: The disparity between international non-proliferation obligations and the practical capacity to detect, prevent and penalise violations.

Transhipment: The movement of goods through an intermediary country or location before reaching their final destination, potentially concealing recipients or circumventing export controls.

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs): Agreed actions, such as information exchanges and advance notifications, designed to reduce suspicion and prevent miscalculation between states.

Missile defence: Systems and capabilities designed to detect, track and intercept incoming missiles before they reach their intended targets.

Cruise missile: A guided missile that sustains powered flight through the atmosphere and follows a controlled trajectory towards its target.

Proliferation (Horizontal vs. Vertical): Horizontal proliferation involves additional states acquiring a capability; vertical proliferation involves existing possessors expanding or modernising their arsenals.

UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA): A UN transparency mechanism through which states report international transfers of specified categories of conventional arms to promote confidence and accountability.

Missile range classes: Categories distinguishing missiles by maximum range, commonly including short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.

Catch-all controls: Export-control provisions allowing restrictions on unlisted items when there are grounds to suspect their use in prohibited weapons programmes.

Intangible Transfer of Technology (ITT): The electronic or knowledge-based transfer of controlled technical information, software or expertise without physically shipping equipment.

Front companies and illicit procurement networks: Businesses or interconnected entities used to conceal the true beneficiaries of transactions and obtain restricted technologies while evading export controls.

Key Issues

1. The Absence of a Universal Missile Treaty

Unlike nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles are not governed by one universal, legally binding multilateral treaty covering their development, possession, testing and transfer. The international framework instead relies on several mechanisms, including the MTCR, HCoC, national export controls and relevant UN Security Council measures. The GA1 asks whether existing mechanisms should be strengthened or whether new international arrangements are needed.

2. The Dual-Use Nature of Missile Technology

Many technologies used in ballistic missiles also have legitimate civilian applications, particularly in space-launch vehicles. Propulsion, staging, guidance and other technologies can therefore serve both peaceful and military purposes. The challenge is creating effective non-proliferation measures without unnecessarily restricting the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, which is protected under international space law. The HCoC itself recognises the importance of preventing proliferation while preserving the benefits of peaceful space activities.

3. Strengthening the Hague Code of Conduct

The **Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC)** is a politically binding transparency and confidence is a politically binding

transparency and confidence-building instrument. It encourages Pre-Launch Notifications and Annual Declarations concerning ballistic missile and space-launch activities. The General Assembly's Resolution 79/29 welcomed the participation of 145 states and called for further universalisation and improved implementation. Due to recent world events, the GA1 must consider how participation and compliance with the HCoC can be strengthened.

4. Limitations of Existing Export Controls

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) coordinates national export controls on missile-related goods and technologies. However, it is not a UN treaty and its guidelines are implemented through the national policies of participating governments. Changes in manufacturing, supply chains and dual-use technologies create challenges for traditional export-control systems. These export controls need to be consistent and remain effective while avoiding unnecessary restrictions on legitimate civilian technology and international operations.

5. Domestic Production and Technology Indigenisation

States may increasingly develop their own missile production capabilities instead of relying entirely on foreign suppliers. Advances in manufacturing, electronics and other technologies can make it harder for export controls alone to prevent the development of sophisticated missile systems. This raises the question of how international mechanisms can address these domestic production and technological mechanisms while respecting state sovereignty and legitimate technological development.

6. Proliferation to Non-State Members

The transfer of WMD-related delivery systems and technology to non-state members presents a serious security concern. Security Council **Resolution 1540 (2004)** required States to prevent non-State members from acquiring nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and requires domestic controls over related materials.

7. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures

A lack of information about missile tests, deployments and national programmes can increase mistrust and the risk of miscalculation. Measures such as pre-launch notifications, annual declarations, information exchanges and regional communication channels can improve transparency and confidence between states. How can such measures be expanded while respecting legitimate national security concerns? The HCoC specifically identifies transparency and confidence-building as central elements of its framework.

8. The MTCR's 500 kg / 300 km Threshold

The MTCR identifies certain Category I systems as complete rocket systems, including ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles, capable of delivering a **500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km**. However, this is an **MTCR control threshold,** not a universal legal definition of a WMD-capable missile. The existence of such a threshold raises questions about whether current control lists adequately reflect technological developments and whether additional technologies or systems require greater international attention.

9. Regional Missile Proliferation & Arms Races

Missile programmes can become closely connected to regional security dilemmas. When one state expands or modernises its missile capabilities, neighbouring states may respond by developing or strengthening their own systems. This can contribute to arms races, mistrust and increased regional tensions. GA1 must therefore consider regional confidence-building, dialogue and risk-reduction measures alongside broader global mechanisms.

10. Balancing Non-Proliferation with Peaceful Space Activities

Any international mechanism must balance non-proliferation objectives with the recognised right of states to benefit from the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. The Outer Space Treaty establishes that outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States, while prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons and other WMD in orbit or on celestial bodies. The HCoC similarly recognises the importance of preventing missile proliferation while maintaining space activities.

Major Stakeholders

United States: The US prioritises missile non-proliferation through strict export controls, missile defence and international cooperation. As a founding member of the MTCR, it seeks to restrict the transfer of technologies capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction while preserving its strategic deterrence capabilities.

Russian Federation: Russia advocates strategic stability, multilateral arms control and respect for national security interests. As a major missile power and permanent Security Council member, it opposes security arrangements it considers threatening while maintaining extensive missile capabilities of its own.

China: China supports multilateral disarmament and strategic stability, arguing that international security must account for the interests of all states. Its expanding missile capabilities and opposition to perceived strategic imbalances make its participation crucial to effective global non-proliferation efforts.

United Kingdom and France: Both countries are nuclear-armed states, permanent Security Council members and founding participants in the MTCR. They support export controls and international non-proliferation initiatives while retaining independent nuclear deterrence and advanced missile capabilities for national defence.

India: India joined the MTCR and subscribed to the HCoC in 2016, demonstrating participation in international missile non-proliferation initiatives. It maintains national export controls and supports responsible technology transfers while continuing to modernise its missile capabilities in response to regional security concerns.

Pakistan: Pakistan advocates internationally negotiated, non-discriminatory non-proliferation measures and maintains national export controls and command-and-control mechanisms. However, it regards missile capabilities as essential to deterrence and strategic balance, particularly in the context of its rivalry with India.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea): North Korea continues to develop and test ballistic missiles despite UN Security Council restrictions. Its activities challenge international enforcement mechanisms, heighten regional tensions and demonstrate the difficulty of restraining missile programmes when states reject or disregard international demands.

Japan and South Korea: Both countries prioritise deterrence, missile defence and regional stability in response to North Korea's expanding missile programme. Japan was an original MTCR participant, while South Korea joined in 200. Both support export controls and international cooperation to limit missile proliferation.

Past Actions

The Missile Technology Control Regime:

The Missile Technology Control Regime was announced in 1987 by seven main countries, namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The regime has 35 former members. It is not a treaty; instead, it's a kind of agreement between countries where they follow the same export rules and a shared list of controlled items, which they then apply through their own national laws. For the most sensitive items, transferring the technology to produce them is also completely prohibited.

However, one problem is that the technologies used in launching satellites and ballistic missiles are almost identical. The MTCR partners agree that the technology in a space launch vehicle is basically identical to that in a ballistic missile. This makes it very hard to block weapons programs without also blocking peaceful space programs. Therefore, as early as 1996, partners agreed that the regime needed to work with countries outside and tried to control the transhipment of missile technology without disturbing actual trade, and this is a challenge that still exists today.

The Hague Code:

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation was signed on 25 November 2002, and it is the only multilateral instrument that deals exactly with ballistic missiles. Countries that join the code promise to show restraint, and they also publish an annual declaration of missile policies and give notice before a missile or space launch.

The code does not ban missiles and it does not ask anyone to destroy them. Its main aim is to build trust through transparency. It is politically binding, although it is not legally binding. So, no country can be taken to any sort of court for breaking it. It was started by 93 subscribing states and it reached approximately 145 by March 2024.

Resolution 1540:

In 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1540. In this resolution, it requires all states to avoid supporting non-state actors, such as terrorists or criminal groups that try to obtain nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their delivery systems. The resolution considers missiles and rockets as means of delivery. This was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and it is legally binding on every state. It created a committee to track how well countries are implementing it. Its focus is on non-state groups, not on states with their own missile programs. In the early years, many UN members were slow to implement it fully.

Studies on missiles. Next line. Right now, there is no legally binding multilateral instrument that deals with missiles. The UN has tried to find common ground in a few steps. We can start in 2000, when the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to set up panels of government experts, which are small groups of national experts, to study the issue. Three panels have met so far: one in 2001-2002, the other in 2004, and the last one in 2007-2008. The first panel's 2002 report was the UN's first look at missiles in all their aspects. It listed several concerns, including more missiles with longer range and better technology spreading to more countries, the use of space launch technology to build missiles, missile defence systems, and the role missiles play in military planning and the need for confidence-building measures. The panel said all of these were serious concerns for international

peace and security. It also mentioned that countries were already working on the issue in many different ways, inside and outside the UN, and that this work should continue.

The second panel in 2004 held three sessions, but could not agree on the final report because the topic was extremely complex. The Secretary-General then asked the UN Institute for Disarmament Research to help write a report where countries might find agreement. The third panel followed and did reach a consensus report in 2008. However, this report did not propose rules. It listed the issues any complete approach would have to deal with, including:

*** The regional and global security situation that drives countries to develop missiles**

*** The transfer of missile technology and the use of missiles by state and non-state groups**

*** The link between missiles and disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation**

*** The difference between ballistic and cruise missiles and between nuclear and conventional payloads**

*** Missile defense**

*** The growing use of space-based technology**

The panel concluded that the international community should keep working on the issue and focus on areas where states already agree. It also mentioned that the UN could offer a more structured way to build that agreement. The General Assembly welcomed the report in 2008 and asked countries to send in their views. Only three countries had replied by mid-2010, and their answers show a split that still exists today. Some countries want a global binding treaty with UN monitoring, while others warned that rules on weapons must not weaken a state's right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Issues of binding missile treaties.:

Since no global missile treaty exists, the binding limits that have existed were mostly deals between two countries. The best-known deal is the 1987 INF treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was the first nuclear arms treaty to actually reduce weapons instead of just scrapping them. It ended in 2019 when the United States withdrew from the treaty. The US said Russia had violated, and Russia denied this. The lesson for delegates is that a two-country deal depends on those two countries actually trusting each other and leaves outside the rules.

A wider agreement would need to deal with the same problems that the UN panels actually list. Missiles can carry conventional or nuclear weapons, so the same system can mean different things to different countries. States link missiles to their right to self-defence, and rockets for satellites and missiles use very similar technology. So, strict controls can actually affect peaceful space programs as well. It's this lack of difference that actually makes it hard to make any sort of binding treaty.

Sanctions and monitoring by the UNSC:

The Security Council actually uses targeted sanctions to pressure those who breach peace. This includes travel bans, freezing assets and embargoes on arms and other such goods. To check whether countries are following the sanctions, the council has used a panel of experts, which are small independent teams that investigate violations and report them to a sanctions committee. Studies of these panels show a very common pattern. They can gather valuable information, but their work depends on whether the council and member states act on it. Panel experts also describe blocked access to sites, short investigation periods, and political pressure after publishing findings. Even so, many of them believe that monitoring helps because it raises the risk for anyone thinking of breaking the rules.

The same pattern appeared in a missile-related sanction. In the North Korea case, the panel of experts ended in 2024, around April, after a six-year Security Council veto. The sanctions themselves stayed in force. A group of states later created a separate monitoring team outside the Security Council. For delegates, this raises a very important question of how to keep monitoring

independent. Why and when the council cannot agree.

Possible Solutions

Grow the Hague Code:

The Hague Code has about 145 countries, which is currently more than any other missile-related instrument. However, it only works as well as the information the countries actually share. The solution can be split into three main parts:

- Outreach to the countries which have not joined. Delegates can propose more meetings with different countries from different places. With a clear message that joining does not actually ban missiles,7 does not stop their space program and costs very little.
- A simple template for annual declarations. Right now it is extremely hard to actually compare what different countries report. The standard form covering missile policy, launch numbers, and notifications sent would make the reports easier to read and harder to be left vague. The subscribing state should also present a summary of how many reports arrived at their yearly meeting in Vienna.
- A friendly peer review should be established. Subscribing states should take turns presenting their policies and answering questions from other members. There would be no punishment even if they did not choose to take any questions. But regular questions would create pressure to report honestly.

The main objection is secrecy. Countries don't want to reveal their personal military details. And the answer is that these reports ask for policies and launch notices, not the exact missile designs, which is already what the code requires. Delegates who want to build something binding should note that many countries would leave the code if it became legally binding. So the solution should be aimed at building trust first.

1. **Help countries build and enforce their own export controls:**

Rules on paper do nothing if an actual customs officer cannot recognise a dangerous shipment or a licensing office has zero staff. Resolution 1540 already requires states to have effect. Controls and the 15040 committee track the progress. Many states want to comply but the lack of money, training people, and legal expertise causes them not to. A practical program should include:

- Experts and training on request. MTCR partners and other states with strong systems could lend experts to help draft laws, set up licensing offices and actually train officers to spot dual-use goods. Dual-use goods are items that would have both civilian and military uses.
- There should be a tighter check on transhipment. Dangerous goods often pass to a third country's port on their way to their destination. Customs authorities should set up quick alerts to share information about suspicious cargo.
- A fair path for peaceful space programs. The licensing process should recognise legitimate satellite launch customers so that developing countries do not feel like they are being blocked from actual space exploration.

The likely objection is that this could feel like outsiders interfering in national affairs, and this is why the help should be offered on request and paid for by voluntary contributions, with each country remaining in charge of its own laws.

2. Protect sanctions monitoring and make sure findings lead to actions

Studies of the UN panel of experts are very useful, but their reports mean little if nobody actually acts on them. The North Korea panel also showed another weakness. Its mandate had to be renewed every year. So each renewal was a chance for one veto to actually end it. Delegates could propose:

- Longer mandates should be set. Multi-year mandates for panels would make it harder to shut one down in a single vote.
- Better working conditions. This means guaranteed access to ports and documents, enough time to investigate and protection for the experts from pressure after they publish their findings. These were all problems that the experts themselves have reported.
- There should also be a backup option in place. About fifty states publicly called for independent monitoring to continue even after the North Korea panel ended, and three countries launched a separate monitoring team. Delegates can discuss a standing arrangement funded voluntarily by one willing state that can step in when the council cannot agree. Its reports can be shared with all UN members and with companies that use the old panels' information to check their own supply chains.
- Follow-up should also be regularly done. Sanctions committees could publish how they responded to each panel recommendation and countries named in the report. They should be asked to explain why they did it.

The only weak point in this is legitimacy. A group outside the Security Council may be seen as representing only some countries. To address this, the team should be open to any state that wants to contribute and should report to the wider UN membership instead of the Security Council itself.

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